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Abstract 
The recession of 2008-2009 inflicted a larger cumulative loss of UK output than any of the 
other post-war recessions. Nevertheless, employment rates remained higher than might have 
been expected given the experience of previous recessions. The main reasons for this appear 
to be a combination of high firm profitability levels going into the recession, supportive 
monetary and fiscal policies during the recession, reductions in real producer wages and 
relatively buoyant real consumer wages. Unemployment had reached its lowest levels for 
thirty years going in to the latest recession and has also remained relatively subdued through 
the downturn, certainly compared to previous recessions. A combination of lower inflow 
rates into unemployment, allied with a relatively higher outflow rate into employment, 
underlie this. As government support for the economy is scaled back and productivity growth 
remains low, it may be that it will take a long time for employment to return to levels last 
seen before the recession. 
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Introduction 
 
After some 15 years of near continuous job growth, the UK employment rate in the middle of 
2008 stood at around 75% of the working age population, a rate broadly in line with previous 
employment peaks observed in 1968, 1978 or 1989.  The UK had also experienced twelve 
years of near continuous decline in unemployment after 1993, following the double digit rates 
of the early 1990s and in the first half of the 1980s. Despite the predictions of some, the 
introduction of the National Minimum Wage in 1999 had little effect on employment over the 
latter half of this period. In 2005, the (OECD-based) unemployment rate fell below 5% for 
the first time since the 1970s and hovered around this rate for the next three years. Then in 
2008, the UK entered what was to be its worst recession since World War 2, in terms of 
output lost. This latest recession was notable in that it was not, unlike the previous two 
recessions, exacerbated by a deliberate policy of fiscal and monetary tightening to squeeze 
demand out of the system in order to get inflation on track. Instead, unemployment rose 
because of an old-fashioned collapse in demand following the bursting of a speculative 
financial sector bubble. Moreover, this time round there has been a deliberate larger and more 
rapid loosening of fiscal and monetary policy to try and offset the fall in demand. In some 
ways, policy makers were better prepared this time round. There had been, after all, two 
severe recessions well within memory of most adults over the age of thirty. The 
understandings that were gained under these periods undoubtedly helped frame a policy 
response in the latest downturn, allied with a greater willingness to intervene than in the past. 
This was also the first recession in which there was a raft of interventionist policies 
introduced by the Labour government in place, centred around the various New Deals, 
designed to help deal with job search effectiveness and address the problems associated with 
long-term unemployment and inactivity. The real test of these policies is yet to come, as 
long-term unemployment starts to build, typically one year after the initial shock. In what 
follows we focus on the immediate labour market consequences of the recession compared to 
previous downturns in the UK. 
So was UK labour market performance during this latest recession any different? In 
what follows, we chart the performance of UK employment and unemployment over the 
recession. We then offer some explanations for the results that indicate that the impact on the 
UK labour market has been much less severe than many expected, given the pattern over 
previous recessions and the contemporaneous experience of other industrialised countries. 
We then assess the prospects for UK labour market over the next few years. 
 
 
Employment in the Recession 
 
During the latest recession beginning in 2008 Q2, GDP fell by over 6%, far worse than in the 
recessions of the 1980s or 1990s (see Figure 1), and with six quarters of falling output, it was 
both longer and deeper than the previous two. In the 1980 recession, the percentage fall in 
employment was broadly in line with the percentage fall in GDP.  In the 1990s, the relative 
fall in the employment rate fall in the 1990s was somewhat larger than the percentage decline 
in GDP, (see Figure 1). Moreover, in the previous two recessions (see Figure 2), the fall in 
employment was only halted some 12 to 14 quarters after the onset of recession. Employment 
also remained below its before-recession levels for 18 months or so after the recovery in 
output started. Typically GDP growth of 2% or higher seems to be needed before 
employment starts to rise again, or unemployment starts to fall. 
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Figure 1: Annual Change in Employment and GDP 1979-2009 
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Source: LFS, ONS. http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/gdp0410.pdf 
 
However, the latest recession was strikingly different. Whilst fall in GDP fall was 
markedly worse than in past recessions, the loss of employment was much smaller, some 3% 
of the initial level and the period over which employment fell was much shorter than in the 
past (Figure 2). This is notable, but could it be misleading?  
 
Figure 2: Employment levels from the Start of Recession 
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Source: ONS. Index at Start of Recession = 100 for 1979Q4, 1990 Q2 and 2008 Q1 
respectively 
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To understand the factors that have influenced the preservation of jobs through the 
recession it is worth considering what we know about firms’ workforce strategies. 
Experienced staff are valuable to firms, they have firm-specific knowledge. Losing valuable 
staff knowledge is costly, particularly if it will be needed again in the near future (see 
Geroski and Gregg, 1997, on the evidence for this over the 1990s recession). So firms will 
hold labour where possible through a recession, preferring instead to take short-term hits on 
profitability. However, if a firm is in deep financial trouble such longer-term planning is 
discounted and the firm will take emergency measures to cut costs and improve cash flow. 
This means job cuts, as equivalent cost reductions made through dramatic wage cuts are 
difficult to implement quickly. So a large part of the story of employment through the 
recession is shaped by the extent to which firms are in a battle for survival rather than 
adjusting to, temporarily, lower demand.  
One potential problem with the estimates of numbers in employment concerns recent 
immigrants, particularly migrants from the accession countries of Eastern Europe, (the A8). 
Migrants from the A8 are not covered by the government’s recently introduced points-based 
immigration system and hence not monitored in the same way. This lead some commentators 
to suggest that A8 workers were underestimated in the official employment numbers. So if 
unmeasured A8 migrants returned home in large numbers in response to the recession, this 
could, conceivably, generate a smaller decline in employment in the official data than would 
be the case if all those in employment were measured in the official statistics. The 
employment numbers in Figure 1 are derived from the Labour Force Survey, (LFS), a survey 
of households. It is possible that recent migrants living in temporary accommodation, on 
building sites or farms may not be sampled by the LFS. However there are a number of 
reasons to think that emigration is not a major factor behind the moderate fall in employment.  
First, an alternative data source on employment, the workforce job series, which 
derives employment data based on surveys of firms, shows a similar pattern to that given by 
the LFS. Second, whilst the numbers of new migrants did fall back after 2006, until recently 
the stock of migrants in the workforce was still rising until 2009, suggesting that the duration 
of stay was also rising. It is also not obvious why immigrants to the UK would return to the 
source country if relative job prospects in the source country are worse, as they currently 
appear to be in many A8 countries. Rising unemployment rates and depreciating home 
currencies in 2009, relative to the pound, combined to reduce the relative returns to returning. 
Thirdly there is a question of scale. The number of jobs saved so far relative to what might be 
expected by the drop in GDP, amounts to some 1 million, (3.5% of employment). If however 
1 million jobs had been lost but obscured by immigration, the scale of hidden migration 
would have to be huge and this is highly unlikely. (For example a 10% job loss centred 
exclusively on immigrants would require 10 million hidden immigrants to generate a 1 
million fall in employment). Moreover the recession would have to be centred on sectors that 
employ migrants and there is little evidence that this is the case. In short, it is unlikely that 
mis-measurement of immigration underlies the smaller than expected fall in employment.  
 
 
Accounting for the Behaviour of Employment 
 
So if an estimated net 1 million jobs appear to have been preserved, how has this happened? 
The first point to consider is how widespread across countries this pattern has been and 
whether it is related to institutional differences across countries. Table 1 shows that countries 
like France and Canada have escaped relatively lightly from the recession with around a 3% 
fall in GDP and a similar rise in unemployment, in line with past norms. Whilst in the US, 
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Spain and Ireland, the rise in unemployment exceeded the fall in output. However there are a 
large number of countries with smaller than expected employment falls. Some of these 
countries adopted a deliberate strategy to encourage short-time working rather than lose jobs. 
In Germany the government has supported a policy of short-time working. Similar 
employment subsidy schemes are operating in Italy, the Netherlands and Japan. 
 
Table 1: The Percentage Change in GDP and Unemployment Across Selected Countries 
Over the Recession 
 % Change in GDP 
 
2008 Q1-2009 Q2 
% point change in 
unemployment 
2008 Q1 — 2009 Q4 
Countries with small unemployment rise relative to fall in GDP 
UK   -5.9  2.7  
Sweden -6.1  2.9 
Countries with small unemployment rise relative to GDP and with employment 
subsidies 
Italy  -6.5 1.8  
Germany  -6.3 -0.1 
Netherlands             -5.8  1.2 
Japan -7.1 1.3 
Countries with similar sized unemployment rise and GDP falls  
France            -3.1             2.4 
Countries with  larger unemployment rises than GDP 
falls 
 
US               -3.5             5.0 
Spain                -4.3             9.7 
Ireland               -9.6             8.2 
Countries with little or no GDP fall  
Australia             +1.5             1.5 
Source: OECD.  
 
The UK is one of a smaller number of countries to have experienced relatively small 
employment losses without a deliberate government funded strategy of short hours working. 
Does this mean then that the putative flexible labour market in the UK helped by facilitating 
adjustment in hours or wages instead of jobs? It is important to note that the low employment 
loss countries are not those regarded as having flexible labour markets. The US is held to be 
the prime example of the flexible model and Ireland is also a relatively less regulated country 
and both countries experienced large falls in employment. Spain has strong labour protection 
but also has a large share of temporary jobs, which are weakly protected and have proved to 
be vulnerable in the downturn. In contrast, Sweden, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands have 
relatively high employment protection levels and relatively good employment records over 
their recessions. In short, there is no relationship between a country’s degree of labour market 
flexibility and employment losses in this recession. 
One broad accounting identity, which goes back to Okun, attributes changes in output 
to changes in output per worker (productivity), average hours, the employment rate and the 
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participation rate.1 While this takes no direct account of the role of changes in wages or 
prices, it is useful to look at each of these components in turn. 
 
 
Hours of work 
 
It is typical in recessions for total hours to fall faster than employment. Overtime working is 
often cut first, some workers are placed on short time working and others move into part-time 
work when they struggle to find full-time jobs. Figure 3 gives the annual change in 
employment across the last three recessions (as in Figure 1) and adds the change in total 
hours worked. The difference between the fall in total hours and employment then reflects 
what is happening to average hours. Hours did fall in this recession, by around 2%, but less 
so than in the last two recessions, especially during the 1980s when the government did 
subsidise short-time working in many major manufacturing plants and hours fell by around 
4%.  
 
Figure 3: Annual Percentage Change in Employment and Hours 1979-2009 
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Source: LFS, ONS. 
 
Part-time working rose from around 16% of employment in 1980 (excluding students) 
to 22% in 1995, after which it has been broadly stable. The share of part-time working has 
                                                            
1 One variant of Okun’s Law is that N
N
L
L
E
E
H
H
YY ****=  where Y is output, Y/H is output per hour 
worked, H/E = average hours per worker, E/L is the employment rate (as a fraction of the labour force, L) and 
L/N is the participation rate. In principle this accounting identity could be amended to incorporate wages. The 
decomposition suggests that much of the output fall can be accounted for almost equally by falling productivity, 
average hours and the employment rate. 
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risen during this recession, consistent with the fall in hours above. However this pattern is not 
unique to this recession. Similar or sharper rises in the share of part-time work can be found 
during the last two recessions. The part-time job share tends to stabilise when employment 
recovers to before-recession levels. 
One explanation for differential employment performance across countries over the 
recession, is that the shock of the recession hit sectors with different capital intensities or 
productivity differentials by differing amounts across countries. A high productivity, high 
capital intensity sector, subject to a negative shock is likely to experience a sharper fall in 
output than employment. Figure 4, which shows employment indexed for the beginning of 
the recession across major industry groupings and Table 2 indicate that, in the UK, the 
manufacturing sector, once again experienced the sharpest percentage fall in employment 
over the latest recession, as in previous recessions, (in contrast to the financial sector, the 
source of the recession). Manufacturing and construction have been hardest hit with 8 to 10% 
of employment lost compared to services at under 2%. Since high productivity manufacturing 
experienced the largest employment loss, it is unlikely that the simple shock to a high 
productivity story explains much of what we have observed in the UK. However, within the 
service sector there is considerable variation. In the public services of education, health and 
administration employment has grown by 4%, and employment has fallen by around 4% in 
finance retail (and transport). While these rates are well below construction and 
manufacturing as proportionate declines, because these latter sectors are larger, they account 
for around half of the total jobs lost.  
 
Table 2: Sectoral Trends in Employment 
 1979-83 1983-90 1990-93 1993-2007 2008Q2-
2009Q4 
% Δ Employment -7.3 +15.0 -6.3 +15.6 -2.9 
      
% Δ Manufacturing -21.5 -5.6 -16.7 -27.8 -9.7 
% Δ Finance +3.7 +45.4 -1.5 +51.7 -4.3 
% Δ Construction -9.2 +35.2 -20.6 +18.9 -8.2 
% Δ Retail, Hospitality -3.9 +20.7 -3.6 +12.8 -3.9 
% Δ Public Admin.  0 +13.8 +1.5 +21.9 +3.5 
Source: Workforce jobs series ONS. Authors’ calculations.  
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Figure 4a: Employment Index from 2008q1 for Major Industry Groupings  
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Figure 4b: Employment Index from 2008q1 for Major Service Sector Groupings  
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Since UK output fell much faster than employment or hours worked, then 
productivity also fell sharply. Figure 5 shows that productivity fell by around 2% during 
2008-2009, further and more protracted than in previous downturns. 
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Figure 5: Productivity Levels from the Start of Recession for the 1980s, 1990s and 
2008/09 recessions.  
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Source: ONS. Index at Start of Recession = 100 for 1979Q4, 1990 Q2 and 2008 Q1 
respectively.  
 
This fall in productivity was supported by a sharper collapse in business investment in 
the latest recession compared to earlier downturns, perhaps reflecting the shortage of capital 
available from banks in the credit crunch (see Figure 6). The collapse of investment will 
undoubtedly have contributed to the depth of the recession and to lower productivity growth. 
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Figure 6: Investment Levels from the Start of Recession for the 1980s, 1990s and 
2008/09 recessions. 
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Source: ONS. Index at Start of Recession = 100 for 1979Q4, 1990 Q2 and 2008 Q1 
respectively.  
 
 
Real wages 
 
Over the last fifty years, productivity growth has allowed real wages to grow by around 2% a 
year, on average but falling productivity puts downward pressure on wages. Squeezing real 
wage costs during a recession is not as straightforward as it seems, as pointed out by Keynes. 
Price inflation also tends to fall during downturns so offsetting any moderation in nominal 
wage growth. Furthermore, wages are a major driver of consumer spending and squeezing the 
earnings of consumers and hence demand makes stabilising output harder. While real wage 
estimates over the cycle will be affected by composition effects – more low paid workers are 
likely to lose jobs in a recession – Figure 7 shows the patterns for real wage growth including 
and excluding the impact of mortgage interest rates. It thus captures the growth of real wages 
from the perspective of firms (excluding mortgage rates) and consumers (including mortgage 
rates). In all three recessions, both prices and nominal wage growth slowed sharply. In the 
latest recession real consumer wages rose quite markedly, as mortgage rates were cut 
following the slackening of monetary policy to accommodate the fallout from the crisis in the 
financial sector and Vat was temporarily reduced to 15%. However, real wage growth to 
firms fell to around 3%. This gap between consumer wage growth and that faced by 
producers will have undoubtedly helped firms cope, while sustaining demand.  
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Figure 7: Real Wage Growth (with and without mortgage interest rates)  
Real earnings growth, AEI:  Jan 1979 to Nov 2009
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Source: Labour Force Survey, ONS. 
 
 
Profits 
 
In the 1990s recession, profitability was already being squeezed ahead of the recession 
proper, as interest rates were set high to bear down on inflation, (Figure 8). By contrast this 
time, profits were much higher immediately prior to the recession. This means that the 
immediate pressure on firms to cuts jobs in order to survive was reduced. Since then, 
profitability held up well through the recession. Indeed profits as a share of GDP rose during 
the recession. This is in part due to lower interest rates making financing debt easier; partly 
due to the fall in the exchange rate, unlike in the 1990s when membership of the ERM 
precluded devaluation; partly due to rapid falls in real wages and partly due to the 
maintenance of spending in the economy. The fall in the wage share over the recession means 
that real (producer) wages were falling faster than productivity over this period.2   
                                                            
2 Since the wage share is given by 
EY
Pw
PY
wE
/
/=  where w is the nominal wage, E employment, P pries and Y 
(nominal) output then falling wage share suggests that real wages are falling faster than productivity. 
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Figure 8: Rate of Return on Capital (Profit Rate), Profits as a Share of GDP and Bank 
of England Base Interest Rate, 1989-2009  
 
Source: ONS. Note: GOS=Gross Operating Surplus (the profit share). 
 
 
Unemployment and the Recession 
 
As with employment, the rise in (ILO/OECD) unemployment this time around has been small 
relative to the fall in GDP. Following the 1980 recession, unemployment rose for some 5 
years after the recession end, reaching a peak of 12% in 1986, (Figure 9). In the 1990s, 
unemployment took three years to reach its height following the 1990 recession and while 
still in excess of 10% was lower than in the 1980s. In this recession the rise in unemployment 
was sharp, but, significantly, appears to have stabilised much earlier, even before the 
recession had ended.  
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Figure 9: The ILO Unemployment Rate for UK 1979-2009 
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Source: ONS. 
 
Figure 10 documents the flows that shape the stocks of unemployment, employment 
and inactivity, all measured on the ILO/OECD definition. The top left row gives the flow out 
of employment. It is clear that the employment outflows in this recession were lower than in 
previous recessions, with 96% of those in work staying in work through the year compared to 
92% in the last two recessions. Similarly the outflow from unemployment into employment 
remained higher this time round than in the past downturns, with 35% of those unemployed 
getting work compared to 30% in previous recessions. As a result, the duration of 
unemployment, captured by the U-to-U flow, in row 2 of Figure 10, remained lower than in 
previous downturns. The numbers flowing into economic inactivity, E to N and U to N, have 
been falling or stable in recent years. Outflows from inactivity into unemployment have risen 
in recent years, perhaps as a result of schemes like the New Deals for Lone Parents, Disabled 
People and 50+, which are all aimed at bringing groups with high rates of economic 
inactivity back into the labour force. The Working Tax Credit schemes expanded and 
augmented under Labour, aimed at making hitherto low paid jobs more attractive to the 
unemployed, may also have helped maintain flows into employment. However outflows from 
inactivity into employment are as low in this recession as in previous ones.  
The net result of all these flows is that lower unemployment in this recession has been 
driven by a combination of lower rates of job loss and slightly higher return rates to work 
than in past recessions. 
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Figure 10: Inflows and Outflow Rates Across Employment, Unemployment and 
Inactivity 
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Source: LFS. Note charts show annual transition rates between employment, (E), 
unemployment, (U) and inactivity (N), for population of working age excluding students. 
 
 
Long-term unemployment 
 
In any 3 month window, some 1 million people move into work and 1 million stop working. 
In a recession there are small but important shifts in these patterns. An additional 100,000 
individuals lose work each quarter and 50,000 fewer gain work, leading to unemployment 
rising by 50,000 a month or so. What shifts more markedly is that vacancies are filled much 
faster. Indeed the numbers of unfilled vacancies, registered at Job Centres, have fallen from 
around 700 to 430 thousand over the latest recession. More competition for fewer jobs means 
that it takes longer for any one person to get a job. Inflows into unemployment drive initial 
rises in unemployment, so that the stock is dominated by short-term unemployed. As the 
recession continues and job prospects and hiring stagnate, so long-term unemployment tends 
to rise.  
Long-term unemployment typically begins to rise around one year after the initial rise 
in total unemployment and may often continue to rise even when the total unemployment first 
starts to fall again. In previous recessions, LFS-based long-term unemployment (12 months 
spell or longer), reached 1.2 million, some 40% of the unemployed. Long-term 
unemployment is starting to rise again this time and had reached 700,000 or 25% of the 
workforce by early 2010, still much lower than in the past.  The numbers of long-term 
claimants for unemployment benefits (JSA) tends to be lower than the numbers saying they 
have not worked in the last year (LFS), (see Figure 11). Since the New Deal schemes were 
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introduced this gap has widened sharply. As a result, the numbers who have claimed JSA for 
over a year remains very low in this recession. With the government intervention 
programmes in place the latter should remain relatively low. 
 
Figure 11: Long-Term Unemployment (ILO and Claimant Count)  
LTU (all over 12 months) Claimant Count (18+) v Unemployment (16+)
Seasonally adjusted
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Source: ONS. 
 
The experience of unemployment is also far from even in the population. 
Unemployment has always varied by factors like age, education, gender, ethnicity and region. 
Often the combination of these characteristics acts to make job prospects rather bleak for a 
significant minority. In good times, relative prospects tend to improve for these most 
disadvantaged groups. In bad times, relative prospects for the most disadvantaged worsen. 
Disadvantage amongst the young has been a long standing feature of the labour 
market. As a general rule of thumb, the youth unemployment rate is always double the adult 
rate. However younger workers, as Figure 12 shows, typically have much shorter spells of 
unemployment than others. So while the risk of unemployment is higher among the young, so 
are the chances of escaping it. There are however recent concerns that, for some youths, the 
chances of escaping unemployment are not that high. Unemployment rates among less 
educated young people in the latest recession were well above those of previous recessions, 
whilst the situation for older workers is much better. In this recession, youth unemployment 
rates are nearer three times that of prime age adults, rather than double as in the past. The 
share of long-term unemployed among younger workers in 2009 was much closer to the share 
among older workers than in the past. This development looks set to be to be a cause for 
concern over the next few years. 
15 
Figure 12: Long-Term Unemployment by Age  
% of unemployed by those who are unemployed for over 12 months by age group, Q2 1992 to Q4 
2009
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Source: LFS. 
 
 
Inactivity 
 
Only a minority of those not working at any point in time are unemployed. It is more 
common for people not working to be not actively seeking a job. It is also true that 
unemployment can fall both because individuals find work and because they become 
economically inactive. The main categories of inactivity are students, sickness, early 
retirement or looking after children. Inactivity normally rises in a recession, typically lagging 
behind movement in the unemployment rate by about a year. This can be viewed as a 
response to the recession, though the fact that, as Figure 13 shows, inactivity responds with a 
lag suggests that changes in the participation rate do not account for much of the fall in GDP.  
Some people losing work don’t seek or are unable to find a fresh job. Others take early 
retirement because of this. For others there is a move from, often long-term, unemployment 
into sickness related inactivity. In some respects, for some, this latter movement has proved 
akin to an extended spell of what is effectively long-term unemployment. Figure 13 shows 
the proportion of the working age population who are economically inactive since 1979.  The 
long-term average is for about 22% of the adult population to be neither working or actively 
looking for work. In each of the last two recessions the inactivity rate rose by around 2 
percentage points. The rise in the latest recession has been more modest, but, on the basis of 
past experience, might be expected to increase later in the cycle.  
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Figure 13: Economic Inactivity 1975-2010 Including and Excluding Full-time Students  
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Source: LFS, ONS. 
 
One major development worthy of note is the increase in numbers of young people 
staying on in both further and higher education. Staying on-rates have risen in past recessions 
and the latest downturn has also seen a substantial rise. The second line on Figure 13 tracks 
the inactivity rate excluding full-time students.  On this basis, economic inactivity has falling 
steadily, by around 2 percentage points, since the aftermath of the 1990s recession. In 2009 
there were just over 16% of the adult population neither economically active nor in full-time 
education, the lowest rate for over thirty years. The figure also makes clear that the small rise 
in inactivity observed in this recession has, so far, been mainly due to increased participation 
in education.  
However the news is not all good. The composition of the (non-student) economically 
inactive has shifted markedly over time toward men. The gender ratio in favour of women 
has fallen from 87% in 1979 to 61% in late 2009. Back in 1979 around 40% of women aged 
25+ were economically inactive compared to a rate of under 5% for men. Since then the 
number of women entering the labour force has grown rapidly and shows little sign of 
halting. Rising inactivity for reasons of ill health and disability is concentrated on men. At 
around 2.3 million, there were almost twice as many inactive men as there were unemployed 
men, (on the ILO/OECD definition), in the fourth quarter of 2009. Inactivity rates among 
men under the age of 50 did not fall significantly during the recovery, instead, as Figure 13 
shows, ratcheting upward over time. Policy changes on pensions and incapacity benefits has 
arrested the inflow of sickness related inactivity recently, but the overall level of inactivity 
among men has been persistently high for twenty years. The net result is that inactivity 
among men is, at best, static and remains 3 times higher than the rates observed in the 1970s. 
Indeed more than half of the fall in the male unemployment rate from 1993 to 2008 can be 
accounted for by rising inactivity, though much of that rise in inactivity took place in the 
1990s. 
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Figure 13: Inactivity Rates by Age and Gender 
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Source: LFS. Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 14 shows the numbers in receipt of the major welfare benefits available to 
those out of work. In addition to the large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment benefit 
receipt over time there have been marked increases in claims for Income Support (IS) for 
lone parents and in sickness-related benefits. This amounted to around ¾ million extra claims 
in the 1980s recession and 1 million extra claims in the 1990s recession. Unlike 
unemployment related benefit, claims for these other benefits did not fall back after the 
recessions ended. The claimant numbers for these inactivity benefits only started to fall 
around 2001 and then mainly for lone parents. Lone parents with children aged 7 and over are 
now being moved from IS to unemployment benefits (JSA) that require active job search and 
the new Work Capability Assessment tests are also making claiming disability benefits much 
harder. These changes are pushing up the number of claims for JSA during the recession 
making the small rise in JSA unemployment all the more remarkable. Yet claims for lone 
parent benefits did rise, once again during the latest recession. The uncertainty arises around 
how far, compared to previous recessions, they will rise this time. The expectation is that they 
will not because of the extra support ad job search schemes targeted at not just the 
unemployed but also the inactive. 
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Figure 14: Claims for Different Workless Benefits 1979 to 2008  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This recession has been remarkable for the depth of the fall in GDP and the lengthy duration 
of falling output, but also for the relatively low loss of employment, at least so far. It seems 
that the explanation of how Britain got away with a smaller fall in employment in 2008-2009 
consists of several elements. Policy makers did the right thing in saving the banks, cutting 
interest rates and inducing fiscal and monetary stimuli, that have all helped maintain demand 
and firm cashflow. Workers did the right thing in accepting lower nominal wage growth, 
although real wage growth was sustained by cuts in interest rates and VAT. Firms did the 
right thing in, wherever possible, holding onto valuable labour in the face of the pressure on 
profits and the severe nature of the crisis. Employers entered the recession in good financial 
shape and this has helped avoid the level of job shedding that occurs when firms get into deep 
financial trouble. However, the recession means that firms have under-used labour at the 
moment and this will allow them to grow without then need for extra jobs in the short to 
medium term. However, if demand continues to be weak, then job shedding will continue on 
a slow but sustained basis.  
This recession represents the first serious test of the active labour market policies that 
have been put in place since 1996. Increased conditionality on welfare claimants to take 
active steps to secure work, increased package of support services for job search available to 
those claiming benefits and use of outside providers to deliver these services rather than Job 
Centres are all innovations aimed at keeping individuals in the labour market and maintaining 
search effectiveness. Reforms that increased the financial returns to working relative to not 
working, the National Minimum Wage and Working Tax Credit should also help continue to 
make work pay through a downturn when job prospects may not be as good as in recovery. 
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The signs are that unemployment also has not risen as much as many expected. This is 
to be welcomed, though the ability of the new policies to withstand a build up of long-term 
unemployment that has in the past followed in the wake of a recession is still to be tested.  
The cost has been huge on the public finances and in terms of productivity and this 
will affect cost competitiveness going forward. There are also serious jobless concentrations 
among more marginal groups that 15 years of sustained growth did little to remedy. As a 
result, for some groups, there has been a ratchet upward in joblessness from the 1980s 
onward and this will need to be addressed when the economy recovers. Yet, overall, it seem 
that the labour market has performed relatively better than expected. Whether this generally 
good news will be sustained when the focus shifts to cuts in public spending and employers 
begin to assess their longer-term employment needs is also less than clear. Employment took 
eight to nine years to get back to before-recession levels after the last two recessions. This 
time it might be less if a second wave of job shedding is avoided. 
 
An extended version of this article appears in the opening chapters of ‘The Labour Market in 
Winter 2010. The State of Working Britain’, forthcoming Oxford University Press. 
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